ta *xattr_value,
-			     int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig)
+			     int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig,
+			     bool bprm_is_check)
 {
 	static const char op[] = "appraise_data";
 	int audit_msgno = AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA;
@@ -514,7 +504,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 	 * of the script interpreter(userspace). Differentiate kernel and
 	 * userspace enforced integrity audit messages.
 	 */
-	if (is_bprm_creds_for_exec(func, file))
+	if (bprm_is_check)
 		audit_msgno = AUDIT_INTEGRITY_USERSPACE;
 
 	/* If reading the xattr failed and there's no modsig, error out. */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 5770cf691912a..1d6229b156fb1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -236,7 +236,8 @@ static void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 			       struct lsm_prop *prop, char *buf, loff_t size,
 			       int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
-			       enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
+			       enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
+			       bool bprm_is_check)
 {
 	struct inode *real_inode, *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
@@ -426,7 +427,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 			inode_lock(inode);
 			rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file,
 						      pathname, xattr_value,
-						      xattr_len, modsig);
+						      xattr_len, modsig,
+						      bprm_is_check);
 			inode_unlock(inode);
 		}
 		if (!rc)
@@ -493,14 +495,15 @@ static int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 
 	if (reqprot & PROT_EXEC) {
 		ret = process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL,
-					  0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT, 0);
+					  0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT, 0,
+					  false);
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
 	}
 
 	if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
 		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL,
-					   0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, 0);
+					   0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, 0, false);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -584,7 +587,8 @@ static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
 	return process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(),
-				   &prop, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK, 0);
+				   &prop, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK, 0,
+				   bprm->is_check);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -614,7 +618,7 @@ static int ima_creds_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file)
 
 	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
 	return process_measurement((struct file *)file, bprm->cred, &prop, NULL,
-				   0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK, 0);
+				   0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK, 0, false);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -662,7 +666,7 @@ static int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
 	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0,
 				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
-					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK, 0);
+					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK, 0, false);
 }
 
 static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, char *buf,
@@ -881,7 +885,7 @@ static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
 	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
 	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
 	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0,
-				   MAY_READ, func, 0);
+				   MAY_READ, func, 0, false);
 }
 
 const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
@@ -925,7 +929,7 @@ static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
 	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
 	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, buf, size,
-				   MAY_READ, func, read_id);
+				   MAY_READ, func, read_id, false);
 }
 
 /**
-- 
2.51.0[PATCH 6.19 230/781] ima: Fix stack-out-of-bounds in is_bprm_creds_for_exec()Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> undefinedstable@vger.kernel.org undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined